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Summary of the Dissertation 
A Double-Edged Sword focuses on two human rights reviewing mechanisms set within 
the framework of the United Nations (UN): the state reporting process of the Treaty 
Bodies and the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). The Treaty Bodies were established 
between 1966 and 2006 and consist of committees of independent experts in charge of 
monitoring and supervising states’ implementation of the major UN human rights trea-
ties. One of their main functions is to undertake periodic examinations of states’ fulfill-
ment of treaty provisions on the basis of state reports and additional information pro-
vided by UN bodies and third parties. The output of these reviews consists of a series of 
recommendations for improvement, which are legally nonbinding. Of more recent es-
tablishment, the UPR was instituted in 2007 as a peer review mechanism where states 
review each other’s performance on the basis of all their human rights obligations, 
including: the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
and all other human rights instruments, treaties and voluntary commitments to which 
the state has acceded. In the UPR, states under review are requested to submit a report 
that reflects upon their internal human rights situation, to be complemented by a com-
pilation of information by the UN Secretariat. On the basis of these reports, reviewed 
countries receive recommendations for improvement by other states. As in the case of 
the Treaty Bodies, these recommendations do not pose any legal obligations on states. 
A Double-Edged Sword starts from the assumption that, in the absence of any judicial 
body or enforcement tool capable of obliging states to comply with recommendations, 
a necessary, although not sufficient condition for these mechanisms to ensure compli-
ance is to possess authority. Authority is defined as “a product of the shared beliefs 
about the appropriateness of the organization’s proceduralism, mission, and capabili-
ties” (Cronin & Hurd, 2008, p. 12), which “exists when actors believe that the structures 
embody legitimated power and they act in ways that reinforces [sic] it” (Hurd, 2008, p. 
26). While the factors that may facilitate or hinder the emergence of such authority are 
several, this study focuses on the politicization of the Treaty Bodies and the UPR as a 
factor that is widely considered highly detrimental for the credibility of human rights 
mechanisms, and thus likely to affect their authority. Particularly, the UPR was estab-
lished with the precise aim of avoiding the emergence of politicization. It would thus 
seem fair to assume that politicization is a factor that strongly damages the authority of 
a reviewing procedure. However, prior to this study, no research had been conducted in 
order to empirically assess whether, and under what circumstances, this is actually the 
case. A Double-Edged Sword thus sets out to investigate the extent to which politiciza-
tion exists in the UPR and the state reporting process of the Treaty Bodies, and how its 
presence affects their authority.  
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In sum, the current study answers the following research question: How does politiciza-
tion affect the authority of the UPR and the state reporting process of the Treaty Bod-
ies, and what explains possible differences in the way politicization affects the authority 
of these mechanisms? In order to address this complex question, four steps are taken: 
first, the level of politicization of these reviews is assessed; second, their level of author-
ity is measured; third, the study investigates how politicization affects the authority of 
these mechanisms; fourth, differences in the way politicization affects the authority of 
these instruments are explained. The paragraphs below briefly present the content and 
main findings of the seven chapters of which this book is composed. 
The aim of Chapter 1 is to provide the reader with an overview of the main issues 
touched upon in the book, introducing the cases and the main research questions, as 
well as the study’s contribution to the existing literature. It starts with introducing the 
UPR, the Treaty Bodies, and the two main concepts studied: politicization and authority. 
It then spells out the main research question and the four sub-questions into which the 
research question is divided, and briefly presents the research design. The chapter then 
moves on to presenting the state of the art and the project’s contribution to advancing 
existing knowledge from a theoretical, methodological, and empirical perspective. It 
subsequently provides background information on the two cases and briefly discusses 
the extent to which they are comparable. Finally, it provides an outline of the remaining 
chapters. 
Chapter 2 develops a theoretical and analytical framework to assess and explain the 
way politicization affects the authority of the UPR and the state reporting process of the 
Treaty Bodies. After positioning the thesis within broader debates on the reasons for 
state compliance with international obligations in general, and with international hu-
man rights in particular, the concept of authority is discussed and defined, explaining 
how this abstract notion is operationalized and empirically measured. Following the 
above-mentioned definitions, authority is operationalized as the presence of certain 
beliefs, and of behavior in accordance with such beliefs. First, authority beliefs are con-
ceptualized along the lines of three dimensions: the appropriateness of a review’s mis-
sion, namely, its overall rationale and purpose; of its proceduralism, that is, a review’s 
design and functioning; and of its capabilities, which refers to the reviews’ ability to 
deliver valuable outcomes. Second, authority behavior corresponds to state compliance 
with the formal requirements of the reviews, namely, timely and complete reporting, as 
well as states’ attendance to their own review sessions. Next, the chapter deals with the 
concept of politicization. Politicization is defined as the pursuit of political objectives 
unrelated to human rights, and it is operationalized along the lines of three indicators: 
country bias, wherein some states receive a preferential treatment as compared to 
others due to political reasons; issue bias, namely, the fact that certain issues are sys-
tematically more often addressed than others for political reasons; and instrumental 
use of cultural relativism, where claims of different cultural values are instrumentally 
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employed to justify noncompliance. Additionally, on the basis of existing human rights 
literature, the chapter develops a set of expectations concerning the effects of politici-
zation on authority, which are assumed to be detrimental in all cases. Finally, it sets a 
framework to explain possible differences in the way politicization affects the authority 
of the two mechanisms by focusing on their main structural difference, namely, the 
type of actors undertaking the reviews. 
The aim of Chapter 3 is to outline how the analytical framework developed in the previ-
ous chapter is applied methodologically to the two cases. In order to answer the re-
search question, both cross-case and within-case analysis are employed. Data were 
collected by means of an online survey, forty semi-structured interviews, document 
analysis and nonparticipant observation. Whereas the two latter data sources were 
employed to collect information on state behavior within the mechanisms and to pro-
vide background information and contextualization, survey and interviews were used as 
tools to assess participants’ perceptions. Combining the survey and the interviews pro-
vided the advantage of allowing the researcher to collect views from a relatively large 
number of involved actors in a standardized, highly comparable manner, while at the 
same time probing into respondents’ perceptions in a more in-depth and detailed fash-
ion, providing examples and additional contextualization.  
The first empirical chapter, Chapter 4, comparatively assesses the extent to which the 
UPR and the state reporting process of the Treaty Bodies are deemed to be politicized 
by involved actors. The chapter reveals that, even though politicization is apparent in 
both mechanisms to some extent, the UPR is remarkably more politicized than the state 
reporting process of the Treaty Bodies. UPR recommendations are reported to be politi-
cally motivated much more extensively and frequently than Treaty Bodies’ Concluding 
Observations. Furthermore, country bias takes place to a much larger extent in the UPR 
than in the Treaty Bodies. The analysis additionally revealed that in both reviews certain 
issues are perceived to be systematically more often addressed than others. Yet, 
whereas in the UPR this is largely due to political reasons – for example, when only 
noncontroversial issues are raised by a state in order to avoid creating tensions with the 
reviewed country – in the Treaty Bodies this is believed to mostly occur due to the lack 
of expertise of some committee members. Finally, recommendations are perceived to 
clash with reviewed countries’ values much more often in the UPR than in the Treaty 
Bodies. When this occurs, state delegations reportedly often justify their nonconformity 
by means of cultural relativist arguments, which are considered to be employed instru-
mentally by a large majority of respondents in the case of both mechanisms. 
Chapter 5 proceeds with a comparative assessment of the level of authority of the two 
reviews. First, as concerns the mechanisms’ mission, the chapter shows that expert and 
peer review are considered to be equally appropriate methods to evaluate states’ hu-
man rights performances. Similarly, the international organization hosting the reviews 
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and the standards employed in the assessment of country situations are overwhelming-
ly considered to be appropriate. Second, with relation to the reviews’ proceduralism, 
remarkable differences appear regarding the extent to which standards of assessment 
are applied uniformly across reviews: respondents are strongly unsatisfied with the 
UPR’s performance in this respect, while they are quite positive in the case of the Treaty 
Bodies. More broadly, the section shows that even though involved actors appreciate 
the general design of both Treaty Bodies and the UPR, they believe that in the latter 
case these rules leave excessive room for states to steer and take control of the review, 
and as a result the assessment provided by the mechanism is not always considered to 
be fair. Third, additional variation between the two cases can be observed with relation 
to the capabilities dimension. While the major perceived strength of the Treaty Bodies 
lies in their ability to provide an accurate overview of countries’ performances and 
trigger learning – on which the UPR fared somewhat lower – the UPR scores remarkably 
better than the Treaty Bodies when it comes to generating pressure. Participants in this 
study consider pressure to be the most valuable outcome when it comes to improving 
the human rights situation on the ground. Thus, the UPR is deemed to be remarkably 
more successful in pushing states toward the implementation of recommendations, 
largely by virtue of its ability to generate pressure. Finally, strong variation is observed 
with relation to state compliance with the formal requirements of the mechanisms, the 
behavioral dimension of authority. The chapter reveals that states are very often late in 
their reporting to the Treaty Bodies, and in many cases, they submit no report at all. 
Additionally, the chapter accounts for instances in which states did not even attend 
their own review, which took place in their absence. In contrast, the UPR displays an 
almost complete success rate, as the only case in which a state did not submit a report 
and did not attend its own review was solved after a relatively short time.  
Bringing the results from the two previous empirical chapters together, Chapter 6 stud-
ies the way politicization affects the authority of the UPR and the state reporting pro-
cess of the Treaty Bodies. Chapter 6 argues that politicization has both negative and 
positive consequences on authority, depending on the mechanism at hand. The state 
reporting process of the Treaty Bodies is deemed to be highly successful in producing 
an accurate overview of countries’ performance, providing states with learning oppor-
tunities, and ensuring fair treatment. This falls well in line with the review being only 
limitedly politicized: the fact that no political objectives unrelated to human rights are 
generally pursued in its framework contributes to an objective assessment and fair 
treatment of states. While the UPR scores very poorly in this regard, it is seen as very 
successful in pushing states to comply with formal requirements and in producing rele-
vant outcomes such as triggering pressure and contributing to policy change. As this 
study showed, this is largely due to its highly politicized nature. Thus, politicization has 
negative consequences for beliefs in the proceduralism of both the UPR and the state 
reporting process of the Treaty Bodies. As politicization is present to a much larger 
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extent in the UPR, its negative consequences are felt more strongly there; however, 
when politicization is present in the state reporting process of the Treaty Bodies, its 
negative consequences can be clearly noticed as well. Surprisingly though, politicization 
has remarkably positive consequences on the capabilities and behavioral dimensions of 
authority in the case of the UPR, while it does not have these consequences – not even 
to a smaller extent – when it is present in the case of the Treaty Bodies. In other words, 
politicization appears to be a double-edged sword when it comes to the authority of 
human rights reviewing mechanisms: its presence leads to both positive and negative 
consequences in the case of the UPR, although it only has negative consequences when 
it appears in the state reporting process of the Treaty Bodies. How can we account for 
the different impact of politicization on the authority of the two mechanisms? The 
chapter argues that this has to do with the composition of the reviewing body. The 
supposedly technical nature of committees leads to higher expectations as to the non-
political and expertise-based nature of the review. However, the selection and election 
process of Treaty Bodies does not always guarantee this outcome, and, when commit-
tees do not live up to expectations of expertise and independence, participants in the 
reviews are highly disappointed. In addition, even when committee members act in a 
politicized manner, their recommendations do not carry the political weight they have 
in the UPR, as they are delivered by individuals acting in their personal capacity. The 
output of committees thus does not carry substantial political weight in the eyes of 
reviewed states. Conversely, even though the UPR was set up with the goal of avoiding 
politicization, no one really expected it to achieve this aim. Participants are, therefore, 
not particularly surprised when politicization arises, and the politicized nature of the 
mechanism applies additional pressure on states to comply with both the substantial 
and the formal requirements embedded in the review.  
Chapter 7 concludes the study by summarizing research findings and discussing their 
broader implications for studies on soft governance mechanisms at the global level in 
general, and on the UPR and the state reporting process of the Treaty Bodies in particu-
lar. It specifically shows how the research conducted in A Double-Edged Sword contrib-
utes to the advancement of existing knowledge from a theoretical, methodological, and 
empirical perspective. From a theoretical standpoint, this study contributes to a better 
understanding of the concept of politicization and of its uses in different disciplines, and 
it shows that the general validity of assumptions on the negative consequences of polit-
icization in human rights reviewing mechanisms cannot be taken for granted; addition-
ally, it advances the existing debate on the authority of soft governance instruments, 
and of the factors conducive to authority; finally, it feeds into academic discussions on 
the use of expertise in international organizations. Methodologically, A Double-Edged 
Sword makes a substantial contribution to the study of authority and politicization by 
developing an operationalization of these concepts, spelling out in great detail how they 
can be empirically measured. Additionally, from an empirical perspective, this book 
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sheds light on the way the UPR and the Treaty Bodies instruments function and are 
perceived by involved actors, providing insight into their strengths and weaknesses. The 
chapter then spells out a number of recommendations for further improvement of the 
two mechanisms and, finally, it identifies possible avenues for further research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
